Identity Disorder

Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 23: 158–165, 2010
Copyright C Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1072-0537 print / 1521-0650 online
DOI: 10.1080/10720530903563264

COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY AND DISSOCIATIVE
IDENTITY DISORDER
KARL YNGVAR DALE
University of Tromsø, Tromsø, Norway
˚
ATLE ØDEGARD
Molde University College, Molde, Norway
FINN TSCHUDI
University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
RUEL. CROMWELL
University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, USA
BUDDY SAUNDERS
Bakersfield (California) VA Clinic, Bakersfield, California, USA
˚
AKE ELDEN
University of Tromsø, Tromsø, Norway
ARNE HOLTE
Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway

Thirteen patients with dissociative identity disorder (DID), 13 with other mental
disorders, and 10 nondiagnosed comparison participants weregiven individual
grids. Results showed that displaying alternate personalities did not portend a
more multidimensional level of thinking. Instead, the nonclinical comparison
group had the greater degree of complexity in comparison to both clinical groups.
A notable clinical observation was that DID patients, as compared to non-DID
participants, had a greater understanding and speed incompleting the grid.
Findings are discussed in terms of the advantages of personal construct theory
for conceptualizing the construct of dissociation.

Introduction
Dissociation, as a construct in psychology, springs primarily from
the work of Pierre Janet (1923). It refers to the splitting up of
Received 12 October 2006; accepted 14 June 2009.
The present study was funded by grants from the NorthNorwegian Centre of
Psychiatric Research.
Address correspondence to Karl Yngvar Dale, Storgt. 17A, N-6413 Molde, Norway.
E-mail: kayngv-d@online.no

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thought processes into compartments and, sometimes, to amnesia for certain of these compartments. From the beginning, dissociation was associated with psychological trauma. A history of
trauma wasfound in 44% of Janet’s dissociated patients (van der
Kolk, Brown, & van der Hart, 1989), which is far beyond chance
expectation.
Dissociation emerged separately from the psychoanalytic
construct of repression, which Freud (1915 and 1917/1943) defined as the warding off from conscious awareness of that which
is painful. Although the two constructs arose from different theoretical networks, theyheld a common linkage to trauma and pain.
Both constructs, each rejected by proponents of the other, had the
benefit of being derived from keen observation of clinical cases.
Both also had a systematic relationship to their respective theories. However, neither construct benefited from (a) the philosophical insights of the Vienna Circle (Bergman, 1954), (b) the
psychometric (Stevens, 1946)emphasis on reliable operational
criteria, or (c) the more recent influence of constructivism and
philosophy of science on psychological theory. As professional psychology has developed, the construct of dissociation has become
more objectified in significant ways. One way concerns the formal
typology of the DSM-IV-TR and its operational criteria (American
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000).Accordingly, the DSM-IV-TR
characterizes dissociative identity disorder (DID) as involving the
presence of two or more distinct identities, or personality states,
each with its own relatively enduring pattern of traits (APA, 2000).
When it comes to applying personal construct theory to studying dissociation, both Langelle (1996) and Cromwell, Sewell, and
Langelle (1996) have administered Kelly’s(1955) Role Construct
Repertory Test to high-dissociators, including DID patients. They
hypothesized that high-dissociators differ from both normal controls and other mentally disordered populations in terms of how
they construe the world, relationships, and life events. Cromwell
et al. (1996) suggested that persons with DID, when confronted
with certain contradictory outcomes, do not...